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THE FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING
REQUIREMENTS: TITLE VIII OF THE 1968
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
A combination of economics and racial discrimination has
over many years forced Negroes into unequal and inadequate
housing and living conditions. The Federal Fair Housing Act
of 1968 attempted to contribute to the arsenal of legislation
with which the federal government hopes to eliminate the
ghetto from the American scene. This comment examines this
mnost controversial of recent civil rights laws in light of the
social context from which it arose. Areas of potential
dijiculty in interpretation and construction of the statute are
analyzed and conclusions drawn as to the probable
effectiveness of the Act in relieving the social evils to which it
is directed.
T he Housing Act of 1949 proclaimed a national goal of a
decent home and suitable living environment for every American
family.' Nineteen years later, it was apparent that the country was
still far from realizing this ambition, 2 racial inequality in housing
being a particularly disturbing factor. Figures from the 1960 census
revealed that forty-six percent of the non-white as compared with
fourteen percent of the white urban population lived in unsound
housing. In addition, twenty-five percent of urban non-whites lived
in housing units with more than one person per room, as compared
with eight percent of the white population living under similar
overcrowded conditions. 3 It appears that there was little
improvement during the 1960's, and in fact, living conditions in
Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, § 2, 63 Stat. 413. As amended and codified the Act can
be found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-36 (1964). The Act was passed to state a national housing
objective and to provide means of achieving that objective. It provided federal aid to locally
sponsored slum clearance and low rent public housing projects and financial assistance for
farm housing.
2 See Message from the President of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 243, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 8 (1968).
Hearings on S. 1358. S. 2114 and S. 2280 Relating to Civil Rights and Housing Before
the Subconin. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate Conn. an Banking and
Finance, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 Hearings] (remarks of
Att'y Gen. Ramsey Clark).
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many of the country's urban areas actually worsened during this
period!
Congress designed portions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968r to
provide -a partial remedy for the distressing housing inequities
which exist today and thus to enable the nation to approach its
goal of a decent home and suitable living environment for every
citizen. Title VIII of the Act' represents the first Congressional
attempt since 1866- to deal effectively with racial, ethnic and
religious discrimination in housing on a national level.
Congressional consideration of the fair housing portions of the
1968 Act was prolonged and intensive8 This comment examines the
result of this protracted Congressional deliberation, primarily
dealing with the law's probable effectiveness in advancing its stated
See Message from the President of the United States. supra note 2, at 2.
'82 Stat. 73 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 25, 42 U.S.C.A.).
'42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601-3619 (Supp. 1969).
7 See notes 119-22 infra and accompanying text.
'H.R. 2516, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1967) was the basic civil rights bill to which the
subsequent. fair housing provisions were appended. It passed the House Aug. 16, 1967 by a
vote of 326-93. 113 CoNG. REc. H 10,606 (daily ed. Aug. 16, 1967). The bill, after
considerable amendment, passed the Senate by a vote of 71-20 on Mar. II, 1968) 114 CONG.
REc. S2577-78 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1968). It then took the House another month to approve
the bill as amended, passage being delayed until Apr. 10, 1968. 114 CONG. REc. H2825-26
(daily ed. Apr. 10, 1968). The progress of the bill through the Senate may be followed by
studying changes to the Dirksen amendment to the bill. It was this amendment which eventually
became the fair housing provisions of the Civil Rights Act. See 114 CoNG. REc. S2063-66
(daily ed. Mar. 4, 1968); 114 CONG. REC. S2246-50 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1968); and 114 CONG.
REc. S2464-69 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1968).
Cloture was successfully invoked for only the eighth time in Senate history during the
debate of the bill but only qfter three earlier attempts had failed. The first cloture motion
was defeated 55-37 on Feb. 20, 1968. 114 CONG. REC. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1968).
Debate at this early stage in its history was heated and based primarily upon fear of the
bill's consequences. Sen. Thurmond lamented that "if it should become law, [it] would make
it unlawful for the American citizen to sell his home to a purchaser of his choice." 114
CONG. REC. S1509 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1968). The second attempt to end debate failed six*
days later by a vote of 56-36. 114 CONG. REC. S1644 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1968). The reason
for its failure the second time appears to be that many supporters of the principles outlined
in the bill wanted time to work it into more acceptable form. See the remarks of Sen.
Dirksen, 114 CONG. REc. S1629 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1968). The third cloture motion was
defeated on Mar. I, 1968 bya vote of 59-35. 114 CONG. REc. S1972 (daily ed. Mar. I,
1968). Support was growing but the Senate apparently needed more time to reach agreement
as to the final form of the bill. Debate was finally limited on Mar. 4, 1968 when the fourth
cloture motion succeeded, 65 -32. 114 CONG. REC. S2035 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1968). At that
time, there were over eighty amendments still pending, both to the basic bill, H.R. 2516, and
to the Dirksen amendment itself. 114 CONG. REC. S2031-32 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1968).
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policy within the socio-economic setting which prompted the
demand for housing legislation.
CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING
The first half of this century witnessed the transformation of
America from a rural to an urban society The migration of non-
white Americans to and their subsequent confinement within urban
areas is largely responsible for this shift in population. By 1960
seventy-three percent of American Negroes lived in urban areas,10
and while Negroes comprised over one-fourth of the population of
our ten largest cities, they accounted for only five percent of the
population in the metropolitan areas surrounding those cities." This
influx of Negroes has been accompanied by an exodus to suburbia
by many white city dwellers. As a result, our cities have slowly
become black enclaves surrounded by white suburban rings. 2 Such
enclaves exist primarily because of two external forces3-economics
9See G. & E. GRIER. EQUALITY AND BEYOND 17-19 (1966); 1967 Hearings. supra note 3.
at 4.
11 See G. & E. GRIER. supra note 9, at 6-7; 1967 Hearings. supra note 3, at 4.
" Miller, Government's Responsibility Jor Residential Segregation, in RACE AND
PROPERTY 58 (Denton ed. 1964).
U-See generally THE UNITED STATES CONIN'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS. CIVIL RIGHTS
U.S.A./HOUSING IN WASHINGTON. D.C. 32 (1962) [hereinafter cited as CIVIL RIGHTS
U.S.A.]; 1967 Hearings, supra note 3, at 4, 423-24; Alsop, Matter of Fact. Washington
Post, July 13, 1966, § A, at 25, col. 1. For an intensive analysis of the formation of racial
ghettos, see REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 115-21
(1968).
Recently the rate at which whites are leaving the city sharply accelerated. Prior to 1966,
the average rate of exodus was 140,000 persons per year. Between 1966 and 1968, the flow
increased to 500,000 per year. Although the percentage of Negro population in the city is
steadily increasing, the Negro migration to the city has diminished in the past several years.
In the period 1960-1966, Negro urban population increased by an average of 370,000 persons
per year. Between 1966 and 1968, however, the growth rate dropped to 100,000 per year, a
rate which can be attributed largely to ordinary population growth as a function of natural
birth and death factors. These phenomena are accompanied by an as yet unmeasured
movement by Negroes to the suburbs, giving rise not to racial integration, but to the advent
of the "suburban slum-ghetto." N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1969, at I, col. I.
'3 There is little doubt that the contributing factors are external to the inhabitants
themselves. "[Negroes] do not reside today in ghettos as the result of an exercise of free
choice ... wholly unconnected with deliberate segregation and other forms of
discrimination." UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS. RACIAL ISOLATION IN PUBLIC
SCHOOLS Vol. I, at 193 (1967). This is not to say, however, that Negroes as a group desire
to integrate into white areas. There is little firm evidence on either side of the question of
whether Negroes, if given their choice, would prefer to continue to live in relatively
homegeneous racial groups, as long as they can live outside of slum areas.
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and racial discrimination. 4 The Fair Housing Act will achieve its
objective of eliminating housing segregation only if it can
counteract these forces, for although it is difficult to separate or to
weigh the factors,15 it is clear that discrimination alone is largely
responsible for present segregated housing patterns."6
To a certain degree, moral considerations initially motivated
Congress' recent examination of the racially segregated housing
patterns in America. Probably more important as a motivating
force behind the ultimate legislation, however, was the
interdependency between housing discrimination and other areas of
racial injustice to which the nation had already assigned legislative
priority. By 1968 it had become clear that little progress would be
made in equalizing educational and occupational opportunities until
racially segregated housing was eliminated. De facto school
segregation is directly related to existing housing patterns. 7
" 1967 Hearings. supra note 3, at 4 (remarks of Att'y Gen. Clark). The United States
Commission on Civil Rights would add as a third factor to the growth and continuation of
Negro ghettos the resignation to a set and patterned way of life by the ghetto inhabitants.
CIVIL RIGHTS U.S.A., supra note 12, at 5-8. While resignation and passive acceptance might
well be a contributing factor to the continuation of ghetto conditions, however, it is difficult
to consider such acclimation as a contributing factor to the creation of ghettos.
13 1967 Hearings. supra note 3, at 14 (remarks ofAtt'y Gen. Clark).
One approach that can be used to evaluate the relative importance of economics and
discrimination is to assess the size of the potential Negro market for non-ghetto housing,
assuming such housing to be freely available. It has been estimated that approximately sixty
to seventy thousand Negro families living in Chicago, or about one-fourth of the city's
Negro population, are economically capable of moving into white areas, if they were
permitted to do so. Id. at 376 (remarks of Mr. James W. Cook, Pres., Leadership Council
for Metropolitan Open Communities, Chicago). It is interesting to note that if this large
number of Negro buyers suddenly expanded into all-white areas, the resulting dilution would
produce no more than one Negro family for every fourteen white families living in
metropolitan Chicago. Id. One of the potential difficulties of the Act, however, is that this
"'dilution" may not occur; that in fact the legislation may serve only to transfer the ghetto
to a new location and the present segregated living patterns will be continued. For a
statistical analysis of the potential Negro market for non-ghetto housing conducted by the
Housing and Home Finance Agency, see id. at 316-20.
1 See CIVIL RIGHTS U.S.A., supra note 12, at 6 n.9; 1967 Hearings. supra note 3, at 78,
215; Gitelman, Fair Housing in Colorado, 42 DEN. L. CEN. J. 1, 7 (1965).
-rSee UNITED STATES COMI'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Vol. 1. 18-20 (1967); 1967 Hearings. supra note 3, at 161 (remarks of Louis Pollack, Dean,
Yale Law School). Almost ninety percent of Negro elementary school children attend
schools in which over half of the student body is also Negro, RACIAL ISOLATION IN PUBLIC
SCHOOLS, supra, Vol. 1, 3-5, and the ratio of non-white to white students in city schools is
steadily increasing. During the period between 1960 and 1965, the percentage of students
enrolled in city schools who were Negro increased I I% in Baltimore, 12% in Detroit, 12% in
Chicago, 10% in San Francisco, and I Me in St. Louis. 1967 Hearings. supra, at 4.
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Segregated employment patterns and job discrimination also are in
large part products of housing segregation.' Thus Congress, in
enacting open housing legislation, may have been providing the
entire area of civil rights, 9 including previous legislation, with an
bssential foundation.
The impact of segregated housing on other areas of national
concern, however, should not overshadow its impact upon Negro
housing conditions themselves. The tightly confined Negro housing
areas, from which expansion or removal is very difficult,20 result in
insufficient, overcrowded and unsound housing which generally
costs the inhabitant far more than similar housing outside the area
" The discriminatory selectivity of the housing market has effectively barred Negroes from
the expanding employment opportunities in the suburbs. E.g.. 1967 Hearings. supra note 3,
at 103, 217-18, 220. At the same time, the number of jobs available within the inner city has
been steadily decreasing. Figures provided by the National Committee Against
Discrimination in Housing reveal that between 1951 and 1965 the total manufacturing and
trade employment levels in live major cities shifted dramatically from the "'center city" to
the surrounding "ring." For example, the following cities had these rates of decrease in the
city and increase in the surrounding suburban area: New York, city decrease of 12%, ring
increase of 120"r; St. Louis, city decrease of 291, ring increase of 73c; and San Francisco,
city decrease of 13%, ring increase of 50%. See 1967 Hearings. supra note 3, at 246. Further
evidence of this shift in the employment market is provided by a Labor Department survey
which showed that during the first half of this decade 62% of the industrial construction and
521 of commercial construction in the nation's metropolitan areas occurred in the suburbs.
N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1967, at 17, col. 1. Restricting Negroes from moving into areas
affording the greatest job opportunity is probably at least partly responsible for the fact that
during the 1960 to 1965 period, while the national annual family income rose 147, ghetto
incomes continued to decline. The income of residents of Watts (Los Angeles) decreased by
S% during this period and residents of Hough (Cleveland) suffered a 16% decline. 1967
Hearings. supra, at 4-5.
11 "'We must break the ghetto wall if success in any of the related areas is to be possible."
113 CONG. REC. 3395 (1967) (remarks of Senator Hart). By related areas, the Senator was re-
ferring to other areas of activity in the civil rights field: education, health and welfare, employ-
ment, attitudes and aspirations. See generally 1967 Hearings, supra note 3, at 133 (remarks of
Jefferson Fordham, Dean, University of Pennsylvania Law School).
" The lack of available housing is also an important factor in the status of Negro housing.
Since 1946, only two percent of the new housing built in the nation has gone to Negroes.
113 CONG. REc. 991 (1967) (article written by Roy Wilkins of the NAACP). This low figure
surely does not reflect Negro satisfaction with presently available housing, for in 1960 over
twenty-five percent of the non-whites in Chicago and Los Angeles moved from one house to an-
other within the city. R. WEAVER, THE URBAN Cow=tax 231 (1964). '"This shuffling of one-
quarter of the non-white population within some central cities represents, it seems, a
desperate scramble for shelter among those who must play a game of musical chairs within a
restricted housing supply continuously affected by demolition, conversion and losses for other
reasons." Id. at 231-32.
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would cost a white buyer.2 ' Another effect of housing
segregation-the frustration of ghetto living-is the most difficult
to measure but perhaps the most important. It is largely
responsible, according to some analysts, for current racial unrest
and rioting,2 2 and the psychological damage caused by this
frustration is often viewed as the most destructive aspect of ghetto
life.P
Some knowledge of the causes and sources of racial
discrimination is necessary in order to assess the potential success
of congressional efforts to lessen the effects of such discrimination
on housing conditions. While it is difficult to attribute primary
responsibility to any one factor or single group of persons, 2 it is
possible to categorize the major sources of discrimination in
housing and to isolate the apparent motivations of each.
21 This disparity apparently continues even into the moderate income levels and families
with incomes in the $7000 range are as unable to secure decent housing as are those near the
poverty level. R. WEAVER, supra note 20, at 236. See also Groom, Prices in Poor
Neighborhoods, 89 MON. LAB. REV. 1085 (1966).
It is not true, however, that thehigh rent charged slum dwellers necessarily results in high
profits to the landlord. A recent intensive study of tenement ownership in Newark, New
Jersey indicates that rising vacancy rates are undermining the profitability of tenement
ownership. G. STERNLIEB, THE TENE.%IE.," LANDLORD (1966). Nevertheless, while the small
resident slum landlord is gradually succumbing to the financial pressures of urban renewal
and decreasing profitability, there remains a group of non-resident owners who continue to
specialize in large scale investments in slum property. Mandelker & Heeter, Investment
Activities of Relocated Tenement Landlords-A Pilot Study, 1968 URBAN LAW ANNUAL
33,34-35.
- 1967 Hearings. supra note 3, at 98 (remarks of Roy Wilkins of the NAACP). A sequel
to the Kerner Commission Report of 1968 was released in 1969 under the title One Year
Later. Sponsored jointly by the Urban Coalition and Urban America, the report states that
"[A] rising proportion of Negroes in disadvantaged city areas might come to look upon the
deprivation and segregation they suffer as proper justification for violent protest or for
extending support to now isolated extremists who advocate civil disruption by guerilla
tactics."-N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1969, at 20, col. I.
2 The importance of this consideration was emphasized several years ago by the
psychologist, Kenneth Clark: "It is now generally understood that chronic and remedial
social injustices corrode and damage the human personality, thereby robbing it of its
effectiveness, of its creativity, if not its actual humanity.. . . It is the fuel of the protests and
revolts. Racial segregation, like all other forms of cruelty and tyranny, debases all human
beings .... " K. CLARK. DARK GHETro 63 (1965).
23 "The housing industry placed responsibility on the public. Members of the public placed
it on the housing industry, government, and apathy by 'others.' Representatives of the
Federal Government stated that they were doing all that was within their power and
indicated that the responsibility lay with private industry and the general public." CIVIL
RIGHTS U.S.A.. supra note 12, at viii.
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According to the United States Commission on Civil Rights,
there would be little discrimination in housing were it not for the
practices and activities of the housing industryP Prior to 1950, the
Code of Ethics of the National Association of Real Estate Boards
required that: "A Realtor should never be instrumental in
introducing into a neighborhood a character of property or
occupancy, members of any race or nationality, or any individuals
whose presence will clearly be detrimental to property values in that
neighborhood. ' 2 1 Although the provision was amended in 1950 to
exclude the reference to racial considerations,27 there is little doubt
that most realtors still adhere to the basic thought expressed in the
original provision. 8 Real estate agents and brokers frequently deny
that they engage in discriminatory practices and claim that, as an
industry, they work diligently fo place Negroes in desired housing.29
When presented with evidence of discrimination, however, the
industry contends that it discriminates only because of its clients'
demands? ° In addition to the alleged dictates of clients, real estate
brokers find other rationales to support racial discrimination. The
fear of a general decline in property value upon non-white entry
into a white neighborhood is of singular importance to the agent 3'
While some brokers parlay this fear into large profits by engaging
in block-busting activity,32 others, whose commissions as agents are
%3 Id. at 15.
"- Id. at 12 n.12.
The amended provision reads: "The Realtor should not be instrumental in introducing
into a neighborhood a character of property or use which will clearly be detrimental to
property values in that neighborhood." Id. at 12.
' See 1967 Hearings. supra note 3. at 403. As recently as 1955, the St. Louis County Real
Estate Board required that: "No member or our board may, directly or indirectly, sell to
Negroes or be a party to a sale to Negroes, or finance property for sale to or purchase by
Negroes, in any block, unless there are three separate and distinct buildings in such block
already occupied by Negroes." St. Louis County Real Estate Board, Bulletin to All Aciire
Members, June I, 1955. reprinted in D. McE'TIRE, RsIeDE-CE AND RACe 241 (1960).
"1 See 1967 Hearings. supra note 3, at 350-51 (representatives of National Association of
Real Estate Boards).
:1 On the other hand, realtors themselves sometimes admit that this self-serving excuse is
merely a rationalization made to support their own self-motivated actions. Id. at 401.
" See Horowitz, Fourteenth Anendment Aspects oj Racial Discrintination in "Private"
Housing, 52 CALIF. L. REv. I, 33 (1964). Perhaps the best evidence of the rear or lowering
property values is the Code of Ethics of NAREB itself, the intent of which is clearly to avoid
the possibility of such decreases. See note 27 supra.
32 Blockbusting is the practice of buying from frightened homeowners at reduced prices
after first spreading rumors to the effect that Negro entry is inevitable and disastrous to
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determined by the values exchanged in a transaction, are concerned
about introducing racial disharmony into a neighborhood. In
addition to declining property values, most brokers believe very
strongly that they will lose business if they cannot discriminate;
white homeowners, they fear, will refuse to list with them if doing
so will inhibit the owners' right to discriminate.? In addition, many
individual agents are under considerable pressure from local real
estate boards to hold the line against racial integration. As a result,
the individual agent who personally desires to assist a Negro buyer
may be precluded from doing so because of business or professional
considerations?
The real estate industry is joined by the nation's lending
interests in actively discriminating in the housing area. Not only
must the Negro ghetto dweller pay more than his white counterpart
for equivalent housing, 5 but he must also conclude mortgage and
other lending agreements under far less favorable terms, assuming
he can borrow at all.36 Most lending institutions believe that non-
white borrowers are a greater investment risk than white
borrowers3 7 and fear that property values will decline when the
number of non-whites in an area increases, thus jeopardizing their
security in a loan. The cumulative effect of these "facts" often
leads them to conclude that financing a non-white intrusion into a
white neighborhood represents an unacceptable business risk.?
property values. The economic motive behind blockbusting can be very strong, for studies of
the economic benefits accruing to brokers who engage in this practice reveal startling profits.
During one period of blockbusting activity in a defined area, brokers were paying panicked
whites an average of S12,000 for their homes and shortly thereafter were selling the same
houses to incoming Negroes for an average price of S20,000. Witherspoon, Civil Rights
Policy in the Federal System: Proposals .or a Better Use oJ Admtinistrative Process, 74 YALE
L.J. 1171, 1207-08 (1965). Another study determined that real estate speculators engaging in
blockbusting activity generally reap profits equal to double their investment on the average
of every two years. G. & E. GRIER. supra note 9, at 35.
1See L. LAURENTI. PROPERTY ALUES AND RACE: STUDIES IN SEVEN CITIES 17-18 (1961);
Denton, Perspectives on Race and Property, in RACE AND PROPERTY 3, 12 (Denton ed.
1964); Wall St. Journal, June 21, 1967, at I, col. 6.
31 Many realtors were apparently coerced under threat of expulsion from their local
association if they failed to "'contribute" to realtor-sponsored "forced housing" campaigns
directed against state fair housing legislation. Documentary evidence of one such series of
requests for funds is collected in 1967 Hearings. supra note 3, at 408-12.
33 See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
' See Pitts, Mortgage Financing and Race. in RACE AND PROPERTY 99, 107 (Denton ed.
1964).
1d. at 101.
I d. at 10 1-02. See also D. McENTIRE, supra note 28, at 218-19.
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The third corner of the housing discrimination triangle is the
real, estate developer and the apartment house owner. The fear of
property devaluation and loss of business affect their interests much
as such considerations inhibit the broker or agent. Unlike the
individual homeowner or the broker, however, the developer or
apartment owner's financial interest in the property continues after
the individual transaction is completed. This continued involvement
is primarily responsible for the belief that both reputations and
profits depend to a large degree on the maintenance of racial and
cultural homogeneity in their housing developments or apartment
complexesa Such motivations are well entrenched and difficult to
overcome 0
The motives of the white homeowner in discriminating against
potential non-white buyers and lessees are both more subtle and
more encompassing than those of the businessman. Certainly they
range beyond fear inspired by the profit motive. The average
homeowner is said to believe that the introduction of non-white
property owners into his neighborhood will be followed
automatically by a decline in property values.-" This is the
argument most often heard and frequently justified as being a
rational and non-prejudicial attitude toward the problem of
integrating housing. However, this belief is founded upon a myth.
The most comprehensive study conducted on this problem led the
investigator to conclude that the entry of non-whites into previously
all-white neighborhoods most often resulted in price stability or
improvement instead of price weakening. There was, he reported,
no detectable or uniform influence exerted by the entry of non-
whites on property values. 2
3' CIVIL RIGHTS U.S.A., supra note 12, at 10-11. In 1962, shortly after President Kennedy
announced his Executive Order prohibiting discrimination in all federally assisted housing
(see note 75 infra and accompanying text), many builders reduced their operations out of
fear that sales would suffer from an integration of their projects. Wall St. Journal, Dec. 28,
1962. at I. col. 6.
OThe degree to which these beliefs are held is well illustrated by the adamant refusal of a
Chicago landlord to rent an available unit to a college trained Negro research technician who
was employed by a large national corporation. The landlord remained steadfast in spite of
the intervention on the technician's behalf by a local group or clergymen and other citizens,
the chairman of the board of his employer, who offered personal guarantees, the staff of the
Chicago Leadership Council. and finally the personal efforts of the Governor of Illinois.
1967 Hearings, supra note 3, at 377.
"t See 1967 Hearings. supra note 3, at 84-85.
"2 L. LAURENTI, supra note 33, at 47. The figures used in compiling the results of the
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This fear of decreased property values produces generalized
community resistance to integration which undoubtedly affects the
individual property owner who is trying to sell his house and should
reagonably be interested less in the neighborhood economy than he
is in his own. Most homeowners, in the absence of various forms of
community pressure, would probably be willing to sell to the first
otherwise acceptable buyer who offered to meet the asking price,
regardless of his color. If the white seller refuses such an offer,
what he is really asserting, perhaps, is not his own prejudices as
much as the supposed economic and social interests of his
neighbors. He will, after all, be shortly removed from the area 3 A
white homeowner who is himself free of an entrenched prejudice is
subjected to a number of community pressures which tend to
reduce the freedom with which he personally selects his buyer. The
community's apprehensions concerning the stability, social prestige
and physical maintenance of the neighborhood are imposed upon
the individual. Therefore, much of his reaction, in fact, may be
predetermined, not so much by his own beliefs and desires to be
fair, as by his social context. It would probably be inaccurate to
view this sytem as one of coercion, however, because the seller may
harbor sincere personal desires to do what he believes to be in the
interest of his friends and neighbors and will affirmatively want to
accede to their wishes!
author's investigation were based upon the study of ten thousand transactions over a twelve
year period in seven U.S. cities. See also R. WEAVER. THE NEGRO GH~rro 293 (1948); I967
Hearings. supra note 3. at 39, 84. It appears that the primary cause of declining property
values attendant the integration of housing, when such declines do occur, is the self-fulfilling
fear of the white homeowner. Believing he is faced with a precipitous price decline, such an
owner panics, sells quickly, and spawns the predicted lower price. See. e.g., 0. MYRDA1UL.
AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 623 (1962).
13See. e.g., Gitelman, supra note 16, at II; Horowitz, supra note 31, at 33. While
departure from the area provides an escape for the seller who is leaving town, this
consideration is probably not as valid to the homeowner who is merely changing locations
within the same or a nearby community. His circle of friends and neighbors would
presumably remain relatively stable.
"1 See Rice, Bias in Housing: Toward a .Vew Approach. 6 SAN. CLARA LAW. 162, 162-63
(1966) (quoting E.P. Conser, Exec. V.P. of NAREB, as to the many reasons why a white
homeowner resists integration). Among those factors considered, several are particularly
important because they suggest a kind of prejudice which is beyond the reach of legislation.
These factors are the belief that racial integration will adversely affect a homeowner's own
social position; a'preference for racial and cultural similarity between his children and their
friends; and a concern about the possibility of racial intermarriage.
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STATE FAIR HOUSING LEGISLATION
The attack on racially discriminatory housing practices has not
been limited to efforts by the federal government. Twenty-two
states and over eighty cities and counties have enacted open housing
laws.' The scope of the state statutes is varied, ranging from the
provisions in the Oregon statute which extend only to persons
engaged in the selling, leasing or renting of property" to the
comprehensive coverage provided by the Massachusetts statute
which prohibits discrimination in all categories of housing,47 except
leasing of owner-occupied two-family dwellings!' Of the twenty-two
states with fair housing laws, only twelve include the single family
home," and the statutes of only three apply to the rental of a unit
1 States with rair housing statutes are: Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nefw Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington
and Wisconsin. In addition, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands
have each passed a fair housing statute. Major cities with fair housing ordinances are:
Chicago, St. Louis, New York, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. See. e.g., Pearl & Terner, Fair
Housing Laws: Hallway Mark, 54 GEO. L.J. 156 (1965) (including a general history of state
legislation and a detailed history of legislation in New York); Pearl & Terner, Surver- Fair
Housing Laws- Design for Equal Opportniy, 16 STAN. L. REV. 849 (1964) (including a
report of the judicial reception accorded each statute on a state by state basis). For general
summaries and the text of the statutes which had been enacted as of the publication of each
respective source, see LIBRARY OF CONGRESS LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, FAIR
HOUSING LAWS. SUMMARIES AND TEXT OF STATE LAWS (1966) and HOUSING AND HOME
FINANCE AGENCY, FAIR HOUSING LAWS SUMMARIES AND TEXT OF STATE AND MUNICIPAL
LAWs (1964). See also summaries and statistics prepared by the Department of Justice and
HUD, 1967 Hearings. supra note 3, at 51-72.
11 The Oregon statute reads: "(l) No person engaged in the business of selling real
property shall, solely because of race, color, religion or national origin of any person: (a)
Refuse to sell, lease, or rent any real property to a purchaser." ORE. REV. STAT. § 659.033
(1967).
'- For purposes of delineating the types of property subject to fair housing statutes,
housing is generally categorized into four areas: public housing (housing which is provided in
whole or in part by funds from a federal, state or local governmental agency); urban renewal
housing (housing built on land purchased from a governmental agency as part of an urban
renewal program); other publicly assisted housing (housing which is purchased or constructed
with the assistance of government insured loans or mortgages); and private housing (housing
provided without government assistance and owned by private persons or legal entities). See
HOUSING AND HOME FINANCE AGENCY, FAIR HOUSING LAWS - SUMMARIES AND TEXT OF
STATE AND MUNICIPAL LAWS 8 (1964).
"' MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. I51B, § 4(7) (1965). The entire Mass. statute can be found at
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, §§ 1-10 (1965), as amended, ch. 151B, §§ 1-9 (Supp. 1968).
"See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.240 (Supp. 1968); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 69-7-3(l)(d).
69-7-5(l)(b) (Supp. 1965), amending §§ 69-7-3(l)(d), 69-7-5(l)(b) (1964); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53-35(a) (Supp. 1969); Act 193, § 3-4, [19671 Sess. Laws of Hawaii 194; IOWA
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in an owner-occupied two-family house.0 While all statutes are
made applicable to the practices of the real estate industry, six do
not cover the lending practices of financial institutions.'
Generally, the most comprehensive of the state laws are those of
Massachusetts 52 and New York.53 New York, for example, provides
a detailed description of the prohibited unfair housing practices," a
complete administrative procedure to discover, investigate and
impose sanctions on persons found guilty of employing
discriminatory practices, 5 and methods of judicial review.? In
addition, the statute applies to discrimination by the housing
industry, including both brokers and financiers.57
Most state statutes are administered by agencies which existed
prior to the enactment of housing legislation. s Each of the state
laws provides for either misdemeanor fines or damages to be
CODE ANN. § 105A.13 (Supp. 1969); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, §§ 1(13), 4(7) (1965);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363.02(2). 363.03(2) (Supp. 1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18.25-5(n),
18.25-12(g) (Supp. 1967); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296-5(a) (McKinney Supp: 1968); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 34-37-4(A) (Supp. 1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1452(a) (Supp. 1968).
Michigan also apparently has provisions covering the single-family dwelling. Michigan
adopted a new constitution on April I, 1963 which established a Civil Rights Commission.
The Michigan Attorney General has determined that this Commission has self-executing
authority to enforce civil rights to purchase, mortgage, lease and rent private housing
without further legislative authorization. Op. No. 4161, July 22, 1963, reprinted in 8 RACE
REL. L. REP. 1295 (1963). The statutory procedures to be followed by the Civil Rights
Commission are at MIC. STAT. ANN. §§ 3.548(1)-(9) (Supp. 1968).
1*See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.240 (Supp. 1968); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 69-7-5(I)(c)
(1964). There were.no restrictions placed in his opinion by the Michigan Attorney General,
note 49 supra, and presumably renting a two-family home in which the owner occupies one
half is also included within the purview of the Michigan Civil Rights Commission.
"See IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-901-02 (Supp. 1968); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 105A.1 - .14
(Supp. 1969); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17. § 1301 (Supp. 1968); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 354-A:l to A:14 (1966); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 659.010-.115 (1967); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1451-53 (Supp. 1968).
52 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, §§ 1-10 (1957), as amended, ch. 151B, §§ 1-9 (Supp.
1968).
0 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 18a-e (McKinney Supp. 1968); N.Y. ExEc. LAW §§ 290-
301 (McKinney 1951), asaniended. §§ 290-301 (Supp. 1968).
51 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 18b-c (McKinney Supp. 1968); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(5)
(McKinney Supp. 1968).
"N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 297 (McKinney Supp. 1968).
Id. § 298.
"Id. § 296(5)(d)-(e).
" California, for example, empowered its already functioning State Fair Employment
Practices Commission to enforce the provisions of the subsequent fair housing legislation.
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35730 (Vest 1967).
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awarded to the injured complainant in a civil actionP9 While each
state empowers its courts to issue temporary or permanent
injunctions following the establishment of probable cause of an
alleged violation, few permit their administrative agencies to seek an
injunction,0 and only Oregon permits such a sanction to be
imposed prior to an administrative hearing which determines either
probable cause or ultimate liability.6 t
Efforts to give the administering agencies as much latitude as
possible in the scope of sanctions to be employed have met with
little success in the courts. It has been held that -an enabling statute
may not be completely open-ended when describing the action an
enforcement agency may take 2 Commissions must be definitive
*2 The California provisions are typical. After the FEPC has determined that a respondent
has engaged in activity made unlawful by the statute, it may: (1) order the sale or rental of
the concerned property to the complainant; (2) order the sale or rental of a "like
accommodation" or the next similar vacancy; or (3) if neither (1) nor (2) is available, assess
damages in favor of the complainant in an amount not to exceed $500. See CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 35738 (West 1967).
0 States in which the state agency may seek a temporary injunction are: California,
Colorado. Connecticut, Hawaii. Massachusetts. Minnesota, New Jersey (Attorney General).
New York and Pennsylvania. S.ee CALIL.. HwI.TA & SAFItY CODE § 35734 (1967): COLO.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 69-7-6(6)(b) (Supp. 1965); Co. Gi . STAT. ANN. § 53-36a (Supp.
1969). Act 193. § 10(e)(1), [19671 Sess. Laws of Hawaii 194; MASS. ANN. LAWS, Ch.
I5IB. § 5. as amended 151B. § 5 (Supp. 1968). MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.06(3) (Supp.
1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18.25-14.1 (Supp. 1967) (Att'y Gen.); N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 297-6
(McKinney Supp. 1968): PA. STAT. AN. '.'tit. 43, § 959.1 (Supp. 1969).
In the case of New York. it has been judicially determined that, since the state statute
provides for such a course of action, the individual complainant is precluded from personally
seeking an injunction pending the outcome of the administrative hearings. See Redd v. Zier,
229 N.Y.S.2d 582 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (not officially reported). In response to this determination.
New York Attorney General Lefkowitz announced that the state would petition the courts to
obtain temporary injunctions in the cases of individual complainants pending ultimate
disposition by the New York State Commission for Human Rights. N.Y. Herald Tribune,
July 8, 1963. at 2, cols. 3-5. One year later, he was able to announce his success of obtaining
an order prohibiting an alleged violator from leasing the concerned premises. pending
disposition of the complaint before the Commission. N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1964, at 24, col.
7.
"' ORt. Ri:v. STAT. § 659.055. The Oregon statute provides that the filing of a complaint
with the Commissioner of Labor, with subsequent notice being sent to the alleged violator,
places an automatic restraint on the violator so that he is not to dispose of his property or
take any action which would otherwise make the property unavailable. In contrast, and more
representative, is the California statute which allows its FEPC to seek a temporary
restraining order, which in no case is to be in effect for a period in excess of twenty days,
only after having first determined that probable cause exists for believing the allegations in
the filed complaint are true and constitute a violation. See CALIF. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 35734 (West 1967).
' See Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Case, 151 Colo. 235, 250-51, 380 P.2d 34,
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when attempting .to provide accommodations similar to those
originally sought by the successful complainant and the order must
not be so vague as to hamper good faith compliance. 3
Judicial reception of state fair housing legislation has generally
been favdrable. The only state law that has been invalidated to date
is that of Washington, where the supreme court, in O'Meara v.
Washington State Board Against Discrimination," held that a state
statute which prohibited discrimination in the sale or rental of
publicly assisted housing was in violation of the equal protection
clause of the Federal Constitution. 5 The rationale of the other state
courts has been that private property rights are subject to the
state's police powers and that the police power for the protection of
the public safety, morals and health can be properly invoked to
curb discrimination, provided the legislation bears a substantial and
reasonable relation to its stated purpose.6 With the lone O'Meara
42-43 (1962). The enforcement provision of the Colorado statute empowered the Commission
to take "such other action as in the judgment of the commission will effectuate the purposes
of this article." COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 69-7-6(12) (1963). The Colorado Supreme Court
held this to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. The statute has since
been amended to exclude the cited provision. Id. § 69-7-6(12) (Supp. 1965).
'3 See Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrinination v. Colangelo, 344 Mass. 387, 400-01,
182 N.E.2d 595. 603-04 (1962) (an order to make available for rent a unit similar to that
afforded "the most favored tenant" in an apartment is unnecessarily vague and incapable of
enforcement).
"58 Wash. 2d 793, 365 P.2d 1 (1961). cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962).
The influence of the O'Meara case has been slight because its rationale is unclear. The
statute was directed at "publicly-assisted housing" which was defined as housing subject to a
federal loan or mortgage. Three of the majority of five justices believed that this
classification was arbitrary and capricious and had no reasonable relation to the evil at
which the statute was directed. They held that there was no justification for believing that the
beneficiaries of federally approved loans and mortgages were, as a class, a greater source of
racial discrimination than those homeowners who were subject to conventional mortgages or
no mortgage at all. The classification was underinclusive and therefore in violation of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In contrast, the remaining two of the
majority based their disapproval on state constitutional grounds. They determined that the
statute in 1oto was violative of the ninth amendment of the Washington constitution which
prohibited the taking of private property for private use. A private home, they said, was not
made public and therefore outside the ambit of the constitution merely because the legislature
called it public. A home remained private, in their view, with or without an FHA mortgage.
See Van Alstyne, The O'Meara Case and Constitutional Requirements of State And-
Discrimination Housing Laws, 8 How. L.J. 158 (1962); 75 HARv. L. Rev. 1647 (1962); 37
NOTRE DANME LAW. 394 (1962).
"See. e.g., Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 370 P.2d 313. 20 Cal. Rptr. 609
(1962); Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Case, 151 Colo. 235, 380 P.2d 34 (1962);
State Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Pelham Hall Apts., 10 Misc. 2d 334, 170"
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exception, this use of the police power has been determined not to
be violative of due process or equal protection if the designation of
persons or property subject to the anti-discrimination provisions
can be rationally justified.
It is difficult to determine with accuracy the extent to which
state legislation in the housing area has alleviated the problems to
which such laws are directed. A survey made in 1965 by the
National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing revealed
that only twelve percent of the people filing complaints under state
laws were actually receiving the housing sought or comparable
housing6 8 It is doubtful that an aggrieved potential buyer would
voluntarily submit to the rigors of the state procedural process with
only a twelve percent chance of complete satisfaction.
Two factors appear to be primarily responsible for the failure of
state laws to provide an adequate remedy to the Negro who has
been denied housing. One is that most state procedural systems
require an excessive amount of time to reach a conclusion?0 In
addition, the inability of most state commissions to prevent the
respondent home owner from selling or leasing the premises while
the commission is considering the case must be viewed as a major
failure of the state systems?2 This aspect of the state-sponsofed
N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Porter v. Oberlin. I Ohio St. 2d 143, 205 N.E.2d 363 (1965)
(city ordinance).
"See, e.g., Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 370 P.2d 313, 20 Cal. Rptr.
609 (1962); Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Colangelo, 344 Mass. 387,
182 N.E.2d 595 (1962)- Jones v. Haridor Realty Corp., 37 N.J. 384, 181 A.2d 481 (1962);
Levitt and Sons. Inc. v. Division Against Discriminajion. 31 N.J. 514. 158 A.2d 177, cert.
denied, 363 U.S. 418 (1960).
L 1967 Hearings. supra note 3. at 16.
1 Several states have reported a higher degree of success in enabling the aggrieved party to
acquire the desired housing. Massachusetts, for example, was able to offer forty-three percent
of complainants either the accommodations in issue or a comparable unit during the years
1958-65. See 1967 Hearings. supra note 3, at 64. However, sixty percent of those to whom
the same or comparable housing was offered refused to accept. Id. This suggests that the
time required to settle claims negated the salutary effect of the favorable resolution of the
claim itself.
7W all St. Journal, June 21, 1967, at 1, col. 6. This article reaches the conclusion that the
housing laws have proved easy to evade and includes descriptions of the ploys and charades
used by some real estate salesmen to put off and avoid the Negro client.
7' Oregon appears to be the one state whose commission is not so limited. See note 61
supra and accompanying text.
T- New York's experience has been that often after the commission had ruled in favor of a
complainant, the desired home or apartment had already been leased or sold to someone
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efforts is particularly significant in view of the fact that the federal
open housing law suffers- from similar handicaps?3
Another major cause for the relative impotency of state
legislation is that it is necessarily confined to a limited jurisdiction.
Many opponents of local legislation were afraid that the existence
of open housing in their area would attract minorities from
sutrounding jurisdictions which had no equivalent guarantees, and
the limited scope of many of the state laws reflects this fear of
becc ning a refuge for minority groups.74  Furthermore, the
checKerboard pattern of existing laws prevents effective
enforcement. Such a problem is of particular significance in an
area like the District of Columbia, where many counties and two
states provide varying degrees of legislative prohibition in the
neighboring communities of one metropolitan area. Apparently, the
presence of such difficulties and the relatively slow progress of the
states were important factors leading to the federal government's
action.
FEDERAL ATTEMPTS TO REDUCE HOUSING .SEGREGATION-TITLE
VIII
Prior to the enactment of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of
1968, the federal government had made two attempts in this
century to curb the growing trend of racially segregated housing.
An Executive Order on Equal Opportunity in Housing, signed by
President Kennedy in 1962,75 was directed primarily at newly
constructed housing which was subsequently financed with F.H.A.
or V.A. insured or guaranteed loans.6 The Order applied only to
else. In announcing his plans to seek temporary injunctions to prohibit such results, see note
60 supra, Attorney General Lefkowitz said: "Such a situation . . . proves to be a hollow
victory for the prospective tenant and underlines the necessity of seeking the temporary
injunction." N.Y. Herald Tribune, July 8, 1963, at 2, col. 3. Faced with the same problem
and concerned that its inability to prevent a transfer of property before reaching a decision
was undermining its efforts, the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission successfully sought
injunctive authority. Gitelman, supra note 16, at 20. However, the procedure ultimately
approved by the state legislature has been criticized as being ineffective because of the
excessive time required to issue an injunction. Id. at 29.
* See notes 146-50 infra and accompanying text.
' See 1967 Hearings. supra note 3, at 366-67.
Exec. Order No. 11,063, 3 C.F.R. 652 (1959-63 Comp.).
7' Sec. 101 of the Order makes it applicable to federally owned and operated property and




housing not already in existence at the time of the directive, and its
primary sanction, imposed upon one who discriminated in the sale,
rental or financing of a covered housing unit, was to deny future
federally insured funds for property financingYT  Thus, the Order
had little impact upon the individual homeowner who was not
concerned about future financing once he had made his sale 8
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196411 was the second major
federal effort in the area of housing discrimination prior to the
1968 Act. It attempted to proscribe discrimination in programs or
activities which received federal financial assistance, including
within its coverage public housing and urban renewal projects. The
primary sanction authorized was the withholding of federal funds
and financial assistance to those programs or activities found to be
in violation of the Act. 0 Discriminatory exclusion from
participation in or denial of the benefits of federally assisted
programs constituted violation of the Act.8' F.H.A. or V.A.
assisted contracts, however, were excluded from its provisions 2
The combined effects of these efforts by the federal government
to reduce housing discrimination were negligible. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Secretary Weaver
estimated that the combined coverage of both affected less than two
and one-half million housing units out of a total market supply of
over sixty-five million units.P
The limited impact of previous federal efforts, accompanied by
evidence of the limited success of the states, induced Congress once
again to consider fair housing legislation. The civil rights bill
7- Another method of insuring at least partial success was the coercive action of the
Department of Defense. Following issuance of the Executive Order, the Secretary of Defense
directed that all leasing arrangements undertaken by the Department should contain anti-
discriminatory clauses. He further ordered that only those units which were equally and fully
available to all military personnel be allowed to list with base housing offices. However, this
program met with only limited success in off-base housing. 1967 Hearings. supra note 3, at
90.
73 See 1967 Hearings, supra note 3, at 32-33 (remarks of HUD See. Weaver).
7' 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d(1-4) (1964).
- See id. § 2000d(l).
"See id. § 2000d.
I1d. § 2000d(l).
1967 Hearings. supra note 3, at 32. See id. at 80, 217-18.
The House had in 1966 approved H.R. 14765, the Civil Rights Act of 1966. 112 Coxa.
REc. 18739-40 (1966). Title IV of that bill encompassed housing provisions similar in many
respects to the scope of the 1968 leglislation. The Senate, however, failed to pass the bill.
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passed by the House in August of 1967,e8 which was intended to
counteract active intimidation and violence directed at persons
asserting their civil rights, was comprehensively amended in the
Senate toL include broad fair housing legislation 6 Consideration of
these amendments occupied the majority of the Senate's time
during the first months of the second session of the Ninetieth
Congress, 7 and resulted in a statute which applies to roughly eighty
percent of the national housing market.8
The Act makes it unlawful to refuse to sell or rent a dwelling
after receiving a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate after the
receipt of such an offer, because of the race, color, religion or
national origin of the prospective buyer;-" to discriminate against
any person in the terms of such sale or lease; to advertise in such a
manner as to indicate a discriminatory preference; or to represent
After two motions of cloture had been defeated, 112. CONG. REc. 21751 (daily ed. Sept. 14,
1966), 112 CONG. REc. 22114 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1966), majority leader Mansfield
concluded that the sense of the Senate was clear and that further consideration was fruitless.
See 112 CONG. REC. 22114-115 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1966).
1 See note 8 supra.
1 Senator Mondale initially introduced S. 1358, which he sought to have appended to the
House-passed bill. The Mondale bill was well known to the Senate, having been the subject
of hearings conducted by the Senate -Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs of the
Committee on Banking and Currency in August, 1967. See 1967 Hearings. supra note 3. As
embodied in the omnibus bill, S. 1026, it had been discussed in hearings conducted by the
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
concerning the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1967, during August and September of 1967.
There is no report accompanying either S. 1358 or the subsequent Dirksen amendment. See
note 87 infra. The Senate Committee on Banking and Currency did not have time to take
any formal action with regard to the bill before Senator Mondale felt compelled by an
advancing time schedule to present S. 1358, in slightly amended form, to the Senate.
Consequently, the provisions that eventually became Title VIII of the 1968 Act were
considered fully only after reaching the floor of the Senate. See 114 CoNG. REC. S980 (daily
ed. Feb. 6, 1968).
a The Mondale amendment sparked rigorous debate. It prompted Senator Ervin to refer
to certain of its enforcement provisions as being "as rank a prostitution of the judicial
process as has ever been put forward in this Nation." 114 CONG. REc. S2569 (daily ed.
Mar. 1I, 1968). Compromise was eventually effected when Senator Dirksen, on Feb. 28,
1968, offered his substitute amendment, the progress of which can be followed through the
Senate debates. See note 8 supra. From that time until passage on March II, the Senate
devoted itself to amendment. Over eighty such proposals were made and considered.
114 CONG. REC. S2454 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1968) (remarks of Senator Mondale).
42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(a) (Supp. 1969). The requirement that an offer must be bona fide
was added by an amendment introduced by Senator Allott. His purpose was clear: "[1] want
to negate any possibility of undue harassment or pressure upon a seller or lessor." 114
CoNr. REc. 52309 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1968).
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to any person for discriminatory reasons that a dwelling is not
available when in fact it is available. Finally, the Act makes it
unlawful to engage in profit motivated "blockbusting" activities 0
The approach taken by Congress in prohibiting discriminatory
practices in housing was summarized by Attorney General Clark:
[This legislation] is aimed not at privacy, but at commercial
transactions. It would prohibit no one from selling or renting to a
relative or to a friend. There is nothing in this bill to prevent
personal choice where personal choice, not discrimination, is the
real reason for actionY'
The anti-discriminatory provisions of the Act apply to certain
dwellings owned, operated or provided by the federal governmentY2
As so applied, the provisions were effective at the date of enactment
and extend to property covered by F.H.A. and V.A. loansY3 The
1968 Act, however, goes considerably further. Using a step-by-step
graduated approach, all dwellings, subject to two important
exceptions to be noted, are covered by the Act as of January 1,
1969. The three step coverage of Title VIII was adopted to cushion
the impact of this extremely controversial legislation and to allow
-042 U.S.C.A. § 3604(b)-(e) (Supp. 1969).
1' 1967 Hearings. supra note 3, at 6.
1142 U.S.C.A. § 3603(a)(1) (Supp. 1969). "Provided" refers to loans and grants from the
federal government and to loans that are secured by the federal govsrnment (V.A. and
F.H.A. loans). These provisions apply only to loans or agreements made after November 20,
1962 unless such loans were completely repaid prior to the date of passage of the Act in
which case the dwelling so "provided" is exempted from the section. Id. This section has
recently been interpreted as not applying to homes that are not themselves specifically subject to
a federal loan or mortgage. United States v. Knippers & Day Real Estate, Inc., Civil No. 68-
123 (E.D. La., April 24, 1969) (noted in 37 U.S.L.W. 2623). Despite a strong argument by
the government that homes in a subdivision which has received F.H.A. approval were
contemplated by. the Act as being covered, plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to motion
to dismiss at 6, the court determined that since the houses in question were not and never
had been subject to an F.H.A. or other governmental loan, the Act did not apply
notwithstanding the F.H.A. "site approval." Expressly excluded from coverage are dwellings
subject to a mortgage held by an institution insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation or the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. This provision, the
result of an amendment by Senator Allott, was included because the Senate believed that an
FDIC or FSLIC mortgage should not be classified as a federally secured loan. 114 CoNc.
REC. S2316 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1968).
" These provisions of the 1968 Act are identical to those or Title VI of the 1964 Act,
except that F.H.A. and V.A. loans are now covered. See notes 79-82 supra and
accompanying text. During the period 1961-63, roughly twenty percent of all non-farm
mortgages of $20,000 or less were secured by either the F.H.A. or V.A. Pitts, supra note
36, at I11.
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the administrators who were to be responsible for the Act's
enforcement adequate time in which to prepare their respective
organizations and the public for the eventual complete imposition
of the law! 4
One exclusion granted by the Act is the single unit dwelling
which is sold or rented by the owner, provided such person neither
owns nor has title or right to all or part of the proceeds from the
sale or rental of more than three such single-family houses at any
one time05 An owner who is not residing in the house at the time of
sale, or who is not the most recent resident of the house prior to
the sale, is allowed to remain excluded but only for the purpose of
one sale during any two year period! 6 The exempted owner is no
longer excluded after December 31, 1969 if he utilizes the services
of a broker or realtor or if he advertises in a manner that can be
construed under section 804 1 as being discriminatory." The second
"See the remarks of HUD Secretary Weaver, 1967 Hearings. supra note 3, at 47. This
approach, adopted for practical reasons, was severely criticized by those who believed that
the urgency of the housing problem prohibited further delay. It was called "unfortunate and
unresponsive" by Edward Rutledge of the National Committee Against Discrimination in
Housing, id. at 214, and "unwarranted" by James Harvey of the American Friends Service
Committee, id. at 432.
S42 U.S.C.A. § 3603(b)(1) (Supp. 1969). It is estimated that this exemption from the
Act will affect approximately seven million units, or 10.8 percent of the total housing supply.
24 Co.xa. QTLY. ALMANAC 155 (1968).
99 42 U.S.C.A. § 3603(b)(1) (Supp. 1969). This provision was inserted by Senator Byrd to
insure that a homeowner who takes an extended vacation or ledve of absence from his home
and rents it in the interim remains excluded from the Act. Senator Dirksen's amendment
would not have excluded a person in such a situation. See 114 CoNG. REc. S2360 (daily ed.
Mar. 7, 1968).
-42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(c) (Supp. 1969). Under this provision it is unlawful to "make,
print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed,, or published any notice, statement, or
advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference,
limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national origin, or an intention
to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination." Id.
9142 U.S.C.A. § 3603(b)(1) (Supp. 1969). Senator Byrd proposed to exempt any private
individual in the sale or rental of single family units, regardless o.f how many such units he
owned. He further suggested that such an individual be permitted to employ the services of a
broker without losing his favored status. His purpose was to forestall an "assault upon one
of the most priceless of all human rights, the right to use, manage, and to dispose of
property according to one's wishes and one's own good judgment." 114 Co.xa. REC. S2041
(daily ed. Mar. 4, 1968). The amendment, which would have virtually nullified the Dirksen
amendment, was rejected by a vote of 38-56. Id. at S2053. Senaor Baker then proposed to
allow an individual owner, otherwise exempt, to engage a broker and retain his exempt
status. This suggestion almost won approval, but was defeated 43-48. primarily because it
would have permitted an increase in the number of exempted sales and would have increased
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exception to total coverage is "Mrs. Murphy's boarding house,"
which provides an exemption for an owner-occupied dwelling in
which fewer than four other families reside independently of each
other 9
The Act also includes within its scope real estate brokers and
associations, which are prohibited from discriminating in providing
access to their services and facilities. 00 In addition, racial
discrimination is prohibited in the granting of loans or other
financial assistance and in fixing the terms of such loans when the
funds so acquired are to be used for purchasing, constructing,
improving, repairing or maintaining a dwelling. 0'
Section 810 of Title V1110 2 contains the basic enforcement
provisions of the Act, granting to any person'03 who has been or
believes he will be irrevocably injured by a discriminatory housing
practice the right to file, within 180 days of the act's occurrence, a
written complaint with the Secretary of the Department of Housing
and Urban Development."°" The language used is permissive, not
obligatory, and the complainant may forego the administrative
assistance available at HUD and file a civil action in any state,
local or appropriate federal district court.'
When a complaint is filed with HUD a copy must be furnished
to the respondent, who may file an answer if he desires. 6 The
the opportunity for an exempt individual to dispose of his property and, to that extent,
defeat the purpose of the Act. See 114 CoNG. REc. S2232, 2239 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1968).
42 U.S.C.A. § 3603(b)(2) (Sup . 1969). This exemption releases from coverage roughly
5.5 million units, or over 8 percent of the national housing market. 24 CoNG. QTLY.
ALMANAC 155 (1968).
t- 42 U.S.C.A. § 3606 (Supp. 1969).
' Id. § 3605.
I d. § 36 10.
1" As used throughout Title Vill, "person" "includes one or more individuals,
corporations, partnerships, associations, labor organizations, legal representatives, mutual
companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in
bankruptcy, receivers, and fiduciaries." Id. § 3602(d).
101 Id. § 3610(a)-(b).
,03 Id. § 3612. As in the case of the written complaint filed with HUD, the complainant
has 180 days from the date of the alleged discriminatory practice to bring his suit. Id. For
any action brought under section 812, the Act directs the court to "'assign the case for
hearing at the earliest practicable date and cause the case to be in every way expedited."
Id. § 3614.
10 The first regulations promulgated by HUD which pertain to the administrative
procedures to be followed under Title VIII state that the respondent will be allowed twenty
days after his receipt of the complaint in which to file an answer. 34 Fed. Reg. 134 (1969).
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Secretary is then allowed thirty days in which to investigate and
decide whether to take action. If the state where the alleged act
occurred offers substantially equivalent rights and remedies to the
aggrieved party, the Secretary's action is limited to notifying the
.appropriate state agencies. If the state fails to commence
proceedings in thirty days, or if in the Secretary's judgment it is
not acting with reasonable promptness, the Secretary may re-enter
the case and continue his investigation.' 7 The Secretary has a
subpoena power not subject to judicial review, but enforcement of a
subpoena is available only upon petition to a district court. Refusal
to answer the Secretary's subpoena makes a party liable to a fine
of $1000 or one year imprisonment, or both.08
If, following receipt of a complaint or after the required thirty-
day period during which an appropriate state agency has failed to
take action, the Secretary decides to proceed, he is limited to the
use of "informal methods of conference, conciliation, and
persuasion.""' If HUD is unable to secure voluntary compliance
within the required thirty days, the aggrieved party may, within
thirty days thereafter, file an appropriate civil action."10 In such a
case, the complainant having first gone to HUD, resort to a federal
district court is unavailable if applicable local law provides rights
"substantially equivalent" to those provided by the federal statute.
If the action is brought in federal court, the statute waives the
normal jurisdictional amount and establishes appropriate venue as
being where the alleged discriminatory housing practice occurred or
where the respondent resides or transacts his business."' In all
cases the burden of proof is on the complainant."2
The sanctions authorized by the Act include the imposition of a
permanent or temporary injunction or temporary restraining order,
an award of "actual damages" and a maximum of $1000 in
punitive damages. Attorney fees and court costs may also be
awarded to a prevailing plaintiff if, in the court's opinion, the
plaintiff is not financially able to afford such fees." 3




0 Id. § 3610(d).
I d.
"Id. § 3610e).
" Id. § 3612(c). The granting of attorney fees is not as automatic as it is under the Civil
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Further enforcement provisions authorize the Attorney General
of the United States to proceed in a civil action against any person
who, by engaging in a "pattern or practice of resistance," has
interfered with the full enjoyment of any of the rights granted by
Title VIII.114 A civil action may also be brought against anyone
who coerces, intimidates, threatens or interferes with any person
engaged in the enjoyment of any of the rights granted in the anti-
discrimination sections."5 This civil action provision should be read
in conjunction with Title IX of the Civil Rights Act, which
provides a criminal remedy for similar conduct."' Title IX applies
when a person, "whether or not acting under color of law, by force
or threat of force willfully injures, intimidates or interferes with, or
attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any person because
of his race, color, religion or national origin" and because he is
engaged in or connected with activities involving housing
transactions."7 Title IX also makes it unlawful to interfere with a
person who lawfully is assisting or attempting to assist someone
asserting his civil rights."' Thus, Title IX renders criminally liable
any third person who by force or threat of force attempts to
prevent either the buyer or seller from exercising his Title VIII
rights or following its requirements. It should encourage the
housing market to adjust to the Title VIII requirement of non-
discrimination without external hindrance or pressure.
Rights Act of 1964. See generally Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises. Inc., 390 U.S. 400
(1968). The requirement that fees be granted only if the prevailing plaintiff can show to the
satisfaction of the court that he is financially unable to assume them was suggested by
Senator Byrd. 114 CoNG. RI:c. S2308 (daily ed. Mar. 6. 1968). By this provision, Congress
apparently intended not to discourage private litigation but simply to place the awarding or
fees on a more equitable footing. I (remarks of Senator Mondale). By his amendment,
Senator Byrd hoped to preveht a plaintiff who had been awarded damages. possibly
including punitive damages. from also receiving his expenses or litigation in cases in which he
could himself afford such expenses. Ih
11142 U.S.C.A. § 3613 (Supp. 1969).
""1 d. § 3617.
til Id. § 3631.
"- Id. The causal connection must be direct and the motivation must be discriminatory. As
originally worded, the House bill made it unlawful to so interfere while a person was engaged
in protected civil rights activities. The bill was amended, however, to delete while and insert
because. 113 Coxo. Ri:c. H10572 (daily ed. Aug. 16. 1967) (remarks of Rep. Celler). The
"'under color of law** clause was added to make it -crystal clear- that the statute applied to
state officials as well as private individuals. 113 CO'NG. RI:c. H 10514 (daily ed. Aug. 15.
1967) (remarks or Rep. Celler).
"1'42 U.S.C.A. § 3631(c) (Supp. 1969).
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LIMITATIONS AND POTENTIAL PROBLEMS OF TITLE VI I I
The procedural complexity of Title VIII may undermine the
vitality of the entire Fair Housing Act. In the normal case, it will
be significantly easier to contest racially discriminatory practices
under the recently revitalized Civil Rights Act of 1866. Section one
of that Act reads, in part, as follows: "All citizens of the United
States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is
enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold and convey real and personal property.""' 9 The Supreme,
Court, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,20 held that the language
of that statute, now codified as section 1982 of Title 42 of the
United States Code, bars all racial discrimination, public or
private, in the sale or rental of real and personal property, 2' and
that such a proscription was a valid exercise of congressional power
to enforce the thirteenth amendment. 22 The rationale of the Court's
decision was rather simple:
So long as a Negro citizen who wants to buy or rent a home
can be turned away simply because he is not white, he cannot be
said to enjoy 'the same right . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens
. . . to purchase [and] lease. . . real and personal property.""
It is as yet too early to determine the impact of Jones on
housing discrimination, but it would appear to be significant. It
seems clear that the 1866 Act provides judicial relief for racially
discriminatory practices which transcends the coverage provided by
Title VIII.124 Since section 1982 makes no exceptions in its
119 Now 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964).
'* 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
For a sharply different conclusion as to the intended effect of § 1982, see Avins, The
Civil Rights Act of 1,866. The (7vil Rights Bill oj" 1966. and the Right to Buy Property. 40
S. CAL. L. REv. 274, 305 (1967).
1-2 By limiting itself to thirteenth amendment considerations, the Court round it
unnecessary to consider the applicability of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 392 U.S. at 413n.5.
W Id. at 421. The wall Street Journal chastised the Court after its Jones decision for
reaching the -less than obvious conclusion that an amendment outlawing slavery also
permits Congress to outlaw housing discrimination." Wall St. Journal, June 20, 1968, at 16,
cols. 1-2. In an unusual response. Mr. Justice Stewart answered with a letter in which he
defended the Court's decision as saying only that the law meant what it said and that
Congress had the constitutional power to pass it. Vail St. Journal, July 3, 1968, at 6, col. 3.
But cf. Casper. Jones v. Mayer: Clio. Bentused and Confi/sed Muse, 1968 S. CT. REV. 89,
99.
2 Mr. Justice Harlan recognized the potential impact of the majority decision: "In effect,
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mandate and is directed not at the transaction or the seller but at
the rights of the buyer, presumably it covers those dwellings and
persons specifically exempted by Title VIII. It is not, however, a
complete substitute for Title VIII because, unlike the latter, it does
not proscribe discrimination based on religion or national origin .'
Because of the emphasis currently being placed on racial
discrimination, however, it is doubtful that the "expanded"
coverage of the 1968 Act will prove to be significant126 Section
1982 also does not offer any express remedies, although the
Supreme Court found this lack of express authority to be no
handicap in Jones, saying that a federal court could remedy the
infringement of any federally created right and enjoin
discriminatory conduct even though such a sanction was not
provided in the statute.12 Presumably, the allowance of damages is
similarly within the discretion of the courts. 2 18
Section 1982 does, however, afford easier access to enforcement
agencies. The 1866 Act places no limitation on the accessibility of
this Court, by its construction of § 1982, has extended the coverage or federal fair housing'
laws far beyond that which Congress in its wisdom chose to provide in the Civil Rights Act
of 1968." 392 U.S. at 478 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
12- It is also arguable that the 1866 Act does not apply to "blockbusting" and
discriminatory lending practices. Such a limitation was suggested by the Supreme Court in
the Jones case, 392 U.S. at 413. The Justice Department, however, takes a contrary position.
It maintains that Jones stands for the proposition that section 1982 prohibits the sale of
property which in any way discriminates between Negro and white buyers and that this
prohibition encompasses discriminatory financing and prices. See Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae, n.4 at 9-10. Contract Buyers League v. F. s F. Investment, No. 69-C-15
(N.D. Ill. filed in Mar. 1969).
11 During its consideration of the fair housing bill. Congress had very little evidence placed
before it that indicated the existence of discrimination based on religion or national origin.
The debates and hearings pertaining to the 1968 Act are devoted almost exclusively to
consideration of racial discrimination. It appears, therefore, that the Act's prohibition of
religious discrimination and discrimination based on national origin was included primarily
to conform with prior civil rights legislation. The major federal civil rights laws proscribe
discrimination based on race, color, religion or national origin. See Civil Rights Act of
1957 § 104(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1975(c) (1964) (voting rights); Civil Rights Act of
1964 § 201(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1964) (public accommodations), § 301(a), 42
U.S.C. § 2000b(a) (1964) (public facilities), § 407(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(a) (1964)
(public education), § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1964) (equal employment opportunity,
adding sex as a prohibited basis of discrimination).
1- 392 U.S. at 414 n.13.
'*See generalliy J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Bell v. Hood. 327 U.S. 678,
684 (1946): Note, hnplying Civil Remedies Jrom Federal Regulatorr Statutes, 77 HARv. L.
REv. 285 (1963). Q7. Wyandotte Tranasp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 201-04 (1967);
Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, modified 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
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the courts, whereas the 1968 Act apparently extends federal
jurisdiction only to those persons who have not first gone to H U D,
unless their state does not offer substantially equivalent rights. The
language of the statute is not clear with respect to whether a
complainant who has filed a complaint with HUD is temporarily
precluded from resorting to the judiciary for relief. Although
section 810 is merely permissive, section 810(d), in speaking of
when an aggrieved party may resort to the courts, refers to the
necessity of waiting until HUD has determined that it will be
unable to achieve voluntary compliance. Sections 810 and 812,
when read together, apparently allow an aggrieved party to go
either to HUD or to the courts. If he goes to HUD first, time must
be allowed for voluntary compliance by the respondent before the
complainant may take his case to the judiciary. Members of the
House believed this to be the proper interpretation of the Senate-
approved bill.1'2 The 1866 statute, therefore, provides a viable
alternative to the administrative assistance made available by the
more recent Act, and it will apply in more situations, permitting
redress against discriminatory practices which are exempted by
Title VII I.
In contrast to the simplicity of language in section 1982, the
complexity of Title VIII will undoubtedly create problems in
construction and application. Section 807 expressly exempts from
coverage the sale or rental by a religious organization to one of its
own members of a dwelling it owns or operates for other than a
commercial purpose.30 The exemption remains valid unless the
organization itself discriminates on the basis of race, color or
national origin in determining its membership. Also exempted is a
private club, whose membership may be restricted, when it provides
lodgings to its members, provided such accommodations are
operated for a non-commercial purpose as an incident to the club's
primary purpose.'3' Such a club is authorized to give preference to
its own members to the exclusion of non-members.
Religious organizations were exempted apparently to allow
12, See 114 CoNG. REc. H2765, 2817 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1968). See also Note,
Discrimination in Employrment and ht Housing: Private Enjorcement Pro visions ol the Civil
Rights Acts oJ 1964 and 1968). 82 HARV. L. Riv. 834. 838-59 (1969).
- 42 U.S.C.A. § 3607 (Supp. 1969).
rl Id.
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religious freedom in the operation of such facilities as retreats,
orphanages and homes for the aged.1as The private club exemption,
however, is not so readily justifiable and it may be that this
exemption is merely one of the numerous concessions made to gain
sufficient support to pass the law. The private club exemption
follows the wording of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,133 and the
legislative intent associated with the 1964 Act provides a useful tool
in interpreting the 1968 provisions. 3 Emphasis should be placed on
the words "in fact" as they appear in the excluding provision.
Before a club may qualify for exempted status, its membership
must in fict be restricted to applicants satisfying established
qualifications. In addition, the criteria for acceptance must be
based upon some objective standard other than race, for a club
whose membership is determined solely by race is not the kind of
organization Congress intended to exclude. While racial segregation
might result from adherence to objective standards, such a result
must not be directly caused by a series of sham qualifications the
only purpose of which is to attain racial separation135
Commercial advertisers and publishers may find it easy to
evade the advertising provisions of the 1968 Act.Y3 6 Real estate
advertising need not resort to phrases such as "restricted" or
"white only" to convey to the reader that those in the area desire it
to remain a white neighborhood. Such terms as "with club
M See 1967 Hearings. supra note 3. at 365;
1,, The exception to the public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
is provided as follows: "'The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to a private club
or other establishment not in Jact open to the public .... ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1964)
(emphasis added). The 1968 statute provides that it shall be inapplicable to "a private club
not in Jact open to the public .... .- 42 U.S.C.A. § 3607 (Supp. 1969) (emphasis added).
"I' In 1964, Senator Humphrey explained in reference to the 1964 Act that "[W]e intend to
protect the genuine privacy of private clubs . . whose membership is genuinely selective on
some reasonable basis." 110 Co.NG. REC. 13697 (1964).
"'See 114 CONG. REC. S2320-21 (daily ed. Mar. 6. 1968) (remarks of Sen. Long). See
generally WVitherspoon, supra note 32, at 1188. The Supreme Court recently held that an
amusement and recreation area was not a private club within the exclusionary provision of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act merely because it charged a 25 cent annual "membership fee" to
those people who were admitted to the grounds. Such subterfuge, it said, would not dissuade
the Court from finding the area to be a public accommodation and subject to the non-
discrimination prohibitions of the 1964 Act. Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
The Court intimated that it will view with suspicion any "club" that is a profit motivated
business which is neither owned nor operated by its members. Id. at 301.
11a See note 97 supra.
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membership you become eligible to buy" or "conventional
mortgages only" may connote the same idea to the more
sophisticated reader. If the advertising provision is to have any
force at all, the courts will have to examine subtle overtones of the
techniques used to convey discriminatory preferences and pay little
attention to the actual words used. Any advertising which suggests
that occupancy may be dependent on factors other than ability to
pay the stated price should be suspect. In addition, the actual
stringency of the requirement that to remain excluded the individual
homeowner must not advertise in a discriminatory manner can be
questioned. First, it should be noted that advertising is not
disallowed; it is only advertising that "indicates any preference,
limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion or
national origin" which is prohibited.13 7 Second, the individual
homeowner loses his exempted status only if he so advertises "after
notice" that his action is in violation of the statute.' The Act is
silent as to what constitutes notice or by whom notice.can be given.
It seems in accord with the principles upon which the exemption is
based to construe "notice" as more than a questioning glance from
a neighbor. However, if this analysis is correct, the provision's
vitality is seriously weakened, for it is difficult to imagine HUD
representatives scrutinizing the real estate market pages in every
local newspaper. For this reason, courts should give a liberal
construction to the notice requirement. Conceivably, all that is
required is that the advertiser be informed that his conduct is
possibly in violation of the Act. Presumably the intent of Congress
in providing the notice requirement was to prevent an unknowing
and innocent violation by a good faith seller. This intent would be
served by permitting notice to be given by any source whose
reliability or objectivity would lead a reasonably prudent person to
re-examine his actions. Such an interpretation would also serve
partially to close what appears to be a serious loophole in the Act's
otherwise extensive coverage. If it could be shown that the
advertiser knew at the time that his conduct fell within the purview
of the Act, formal notification should not be required.
It has been maintained that a single-family dwelling which was
privately owned would not be exempt, even if satisfying the
' 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(c) (Supp. 1969).
'' Id. § 3603(b)(l)(B).
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exclusion requirements, if the house were subject to a government
secured loan at the date of the enactment of Title VIII . However,
section 803(a), which brings dwellings subject to government
insured or guaranteed loans within the coverage of the Act, is
expressly made subject to subsection (b) of 803 which excludes the
qualifying private owner from the prohibitions of the statute. Thus,
it seems that a single-family, privately owned house which meets
the exclusion provisions of the statute is absolutely exempted,
regardless of the origin or security of its financing.
The requirement that the families residing in "Mrs. Murphy's
boarding house" live "independently" of each other may be
troublesome to the courts. The Act does not define
"independently," nor does it specify with what degree of
independence the families must be living for the rooming house to
qualify for excluded status. Arguably, several families in a boarding
house which provides common kitchen facilities or meals, or
sanitary facilities, are not in fact living independently of each other.
Congress intended, however, to exempt the small rooming house
because of the proximity in which the inhabitants live.' Thus, the
boarding house which provides common facilities would seem to
have strong support for its exempted status, and the requirement of
independence should be read as looking not to the extent of the
physical separation of the boarders but rather to their economic
independence and lack of familial relationship.
Real estate salesmen will find compliance with the law difficult
for other than purely economic reasons. Most real estate agents
view their association with clients as involving a strict agency
relationship. Although the Act makes no provision for the broker
who is advised by his client to accept offers only from whites,
congressional intent in this situation is clear when the Senate's
rejection of two amendments is considered. The first amendment
would have allowed an otherwise exempt individual to use the
facilities and services of salesmen without losing his exempted
status.4 This amendment was offered on the ground that not to
provide for this alternative would exact a harsh penalty upon the
'' Morris & Powe, Constitutional and Statutor" Rights to Open Housing, 44 WAsH. L.
REV. I, 78, 79 (1968).
10See 114 CONG. REC. S 1022 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1968) (remarks of Senator Mondale).
M See 114 CONG. REc. S2232 (daily ed. Mar. 5. 1968).
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real estate industryY12 A second rejected amendment would have
exonerated any agent who violated the Act but did so only because
he was following the instructions of his client.' While a broker
who knows his white client is not going to sell to a non-white buyer
would be justified in simply not bothering to show that particular
home to a prospective Negro buyer, representations to the effect
that an otherwise available home is not available t6 a Negro are
prohibited. Congress apparently declined to protect the real estate
industry in such situations because the result would be that the
individual could screen his own discriminatory preference behind
the shield of the salesman's agency.
A major failing of the Act is its disregard of fundamental
methods such as zoning laws or building codes which presently are
being employed to effect de facto segregation. Such local
ordinances are often geared to the incbme levels of the inhabitants,
and the restrictions they impose directly inhibit the movement of
16w income groups into settled high income areas.' Title VI II will
do little for the Negro who has an annual income of $5000 and
wants to move to a particular town if its zoning laws permit only
two story homes on a minimum of two acres of land. Senator
Proxmire has suggested that the federal government seek to prevent
this type of segregation by denying certain federal grants to areas
whose zoning laws prohibit the arrival of low income groups.15
However, the most important weakness of Title VIII is the
complete lack of enforcement authority given to HUD. 4 Similar
restraints upon state commissions have proved to be a primary
factor in the relatively slow progress realized throughout the state
142 Id. at S2239.
"'See 114 CoNG. REc. S2325 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1968); S 1022 (daily ed. Feb. 7. 1968).
"I' See Aloi, Goldberg & White, Racial and Economic Segregation by Zoning: Death Knell
for Home Rule? I U. TOL. L. REv. 65, 74-80 (1969); Morris & Powe. supra note 139. at 12;
1967 Hearings. supra note 3, at 217, 416.
"' 1967 Hearings. supra note 3, at 176, 177.
"' An exchange between Senator Mondale and Attorney General Clark is partlicularly
interesting in retrospect:
Mondale: "Unless you can move quickly with injunctive powers, the particular sale at
issue will have been consummated, and it will only be after that that you can get to the
merits in a trial in a district court.
Thus. I think injunctive powers are very important. Would you agree to that?"
Clark: "I would certainly agree with the statement that injunctive powers are most
important. Ther are critical to the effective enjorcement of the law." 1967 Hearings. supra
note 3, at 15-16 (emphasis added).
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systems.' 7 As originally subniitted, the fair housing bill gave HUD
the power to issue both temporary restraining orders and
permanent cease and desist orders . 4  But as enacted, the Act limits
HUD to informal persuasion-in spite of the evidence before
Congress that one of the main reasons for the ineffectiveness of the
Executive Order on Equal Opportunity in Housing49 was a lack of
available administrative machinery to provide immediate relief for
the complainant.5 0 The significance of this weakness in Title VIII
cannot be over-emphasized, for if an injured party has little hope of
obtaining the desired house by approaching HUD, there is little
motivation for him to go through the process of filing a complaint.
The only other, course of action available to an aggrieved party
is to bypass HUD and proceed directly in a federal district court.
A preliminary injunction would be well tailored to the needs of a
person confronted with the probability that the house he desires will
no longer be available at the conclusion of administrative or
judicial proceedings. The issuance of such an injunction is
predicated initially upon the ability of the movant to show that he
will be irreparably injured pendente lite if such an order is not
made.15' The criteria most often adopted by the federal courts are
the injury to the claimant if an injunction is not issued and the
possible harm to the opposing party if an injunction is granted.5 2
The scale thus balanced will then be influenced by the probability
of the movant's eventual success on the merits.13 When the
discriminating seller is an individual homeowner, an injunction is
perhaps justified. Subsequent inability to acquire the desired home
should satisfy the requirement of irreparable harm. The question
becomes more difficult when the seller is owher of a two hundred
unit apartment complex, for it is more probable that a victorious
M See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
"I S. 1358, 90th Cong.. Ist Sess. § 11 (1967).
"I See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
1;0 See 1967 Hearings. supra note 3, at 81.
151 See. e.g., Symington Wayne Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 383 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1967);
Ikirt v. Lee Nat'l Corp., 358 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1966); Continental Oil Co. v. Frontier Rer.
Co., 338 F.2d 780 (10th Cir. 1964); Frederick Chusid & Co. v. Marshall Leeman & Co., 279
F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
11See. e.g., Dino DeLaurentiis Cinematografica, Sp.A. v. D-150, Inc., 366 F.2d 373 (2d
Cir. 1966); Ikirt v. Lee Nat'l Corp., 358 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1966); General Time Corp. v.
Talley Indus., Inc., 283 F. Supp. 832, 833 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); O'Connell v. Erie Lackawanna
R.R., 268 F. Supp. 397, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
1 Id.
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claimant will be able to acquire similar, if not identical, housing.,"
It can be argued that such a probability would preclude showing
irreparable damage. Therefore, the courts might be urged to take a
broader view of the irreparable harm requirement, for it is probable
that fear of a temporary injunction is the very threat most likely to
achieve compliance on the part of most apartment owners. This is
particularly true when one considers that the $ 1000 limit on
punitive damages may be of little value in restraining the practices
of the large apartment complex developer. So long as the developer
can remain in business and rent to whom he pleases, it is doubtful
that he would submit to the arguments of an aggrieved person or
HUD. His basic motivation will be to forestall the imagined
commercial consequences of integration. Against this background,
courts should be hesitant to pass over the request for a preliminary
injunction without careful consideration of the consequences to the
effectiveness of the Act as well as to the individual movant.
Correlative to this point is the fact that the procedural
requirements and limitations of the Act place great obstacles in the
path of a complainant who first goes to HUD. Not only is such 4,
person denied immediate access to the federal courts, 5' but he is
also in some cases denied federal judicial protection entirely.",
These procedural difficulties, coupled with HUD's lack of coercive
authority, raise serious doubts as to the role the department can
play in the Act's enforcement.
The extent to which Title VIII has pre-empted state statutes
dealing with similar subject matter is unclear. The Act does state
that it is not intended to pre-empt existing state law if that law
provides "the same rights as are granted by ths [sic] subchapter.'157
In addition, a complainant who has first approached HUD may
not later bring a civil action in a federal court if he has a judicial
remedy under a state or local law which provides rights which are
' In the Jones v. Mayer case, the plaintiffs were not able to obtain the desired housing
because by the time the Supreme Court granted relief, the subdivision in which they had been
refused housing was completely filled. See Casper, supra note 123, at 95-96. However,
future plaintiffs should be subjected to less delay, even without the aid of an injunction, than
the more than two years during which the Joneses were involved.
I's See note 129 supra and accompanying text. In contrast to the delays imposed by the
Act on the complainant who first goes to HUD, an aggrieved party who proceeds directly to
court is entitled to expeditious handling of his case by the court. See note 105 supra.
':' See note 110 supra and accompanying text.
'42 U.S.C.A. § 3615 (Supp. 1969).
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services between black ghetto and white non-ghetto areas falls
within the prohibitions of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.1 67
The only remaining problem is whether Congress has the
authority to deal with purely private action that interferes with
fourteenth amendment rights. In United States v. Guest'6" a
majority of the Court apparently answered that question in the
affirmative despite assertions that the case dealt only with a
question of statutory construction and not congressional power.'
The principle opinion in Guest, delivered by Mr. Justice Stewart,
renewed the Court's allegiance to the state action concept . 7 U It
went on to say that in measuring the degree of state involvement
there is no requirement that state action be "exclusive or direct''
and, indeed, might even be "peripheral" to the activity complained
of.72 Mr. Justice Stewart was careful to point out, however, that
the case required "no determination of the threshold level that state
action must attain in order to create rights under the Equal
'" See Justice Department brief in support of federal fair housing legislation, 1967
Hearings. supra note 3, at 8-14. In support of its contention that the benefits of government
are less available in ghettos, the government relied on authorities which show that public
education, public transportation, the enforcement of building and housing codes, hospital
facilities and law enforcement are each less available to the ghetto resident than to the rest of
the population. Id. See generall.r Abascal, Municipal Services and Equal Protection:
Pariationson a Thenteby Griffin v. Illinois, 20 HAST. L.J. 1367, 1367-68, 1382-87 (1969).
's, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
m 383 U.S. at 749, 755 (Stewart, J., for the Court); id. at 762 n.1 (Harlan, J.. dissenting
in part).
Io d. at 755.
Id.
In d. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). The Court affirmed the decision of
the California Supreme Court in Mulkey/v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 413 P.2d 825. 50 Cal.
Rptr. 881 (1966), that the popularly passed California referendum, Proposition 14, which
declared the state to be "neutral" in the area of fair housing, was sufficient state action to
bring it within the prohibition of the fourteenth amendment. By repealing existing state
statutes, the Court said, the referendum effectively encouraged racial discrimination. The
history and importance of this case has been the subject of numerous articles. See. e.g..
Black, Foreword: -State Action." Equal Protection. and California's Proposition 14. 81
HARv. L. REv. 69 (1967); Horowitz & Karst, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase oJ
Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 S. CT. REv. 39; Horowitz & Karst, The Proposition
Fourteen Cases: Justice in Search of a Justification, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv: 37 (1966); Miller,
Mulkey v. Reitman: A Brave But Futile Gesture? 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 51 (1966); Williams,
Mulkey v. Reitman and State Action, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 26 (1966); 65 Micn. L. REv. 777
(1967); 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1 (1966); 20 "VAND. L. REV. 1346 (1967). See also Hunter v.
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Spaulding v. Blair, 403 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1968); 1969 DUKE
L.J. 185.
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Protection Clause."''7 Others on the Court felt no similar restraint.
Justices Brennan and Clark each apparently concluded that section
5 of the fourteenth amendment empowered Congress to enact
legislation to prevent a denial of fourteenth amendment rights even
if state action in no form was responsible for the denial."' Their
concurrences, representing the opinions of six members of the
Court, suggest the constitutionality of legislation such as Title VIII
which reaches the private action of individuals. 75
Finally, limited support for the fourteenth amendment position
is supplied by one interpretation of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co.,17  which suggests the persuasion of the Court at the time of
that decision. The Jones case dealt with the constitutionality of
portions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and was decided on
thirteenth amendment grounds. The fact situation involved racial
discrimination in housing, but the Court discussed Title VIII only
as was necessary to show its inapplicability to that case."' In doing
so, however, the language used presumed the constitutionality of
Title VIII, and the Court treated the Act, which had been passed
only several months earlier, as an existing and viable statute the
impact of which would be significant.
Additional support for the constitutionality of the Act is
provided by the commerce clause of the Constitution.
Discrimination in housing and the resultant confinement of
Negroes within older homes in ghetto areas reduces to an
indeterminate extent the market demand for new homes and the
interstate movement of this market. The impact of these
consequences on interstate commerce, however slight, is probably
sufficient to justify congressional intervention to protect the
housing industry. Congressional power under the commerce clause
I'' United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 756 (1966).
'7 Justice Clark, with Justices Black and Fortas joining, said: "'[T]here now can be no
doubt that the specific language of § 5 empowers the Congress to enact laws punishing all
conspiracies-with or without state action that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment
rights." Id. at 762. Justice Brennan, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Douglas. said:
"Section 5 authorizes Congress to make laws that it concludes are reasonably necessary to
protect a right created by and arising under that Amendment; and Congress is thus fully
empowered to determine that punishment of private conspiracies interfering with the exercise
of such a right is necessary to its full protection." Id. at 782.
';See Cox, supra note 166, at 103; Morris & Powe. supra note 139. at 42. 57-58.




"substantially equivalent" to the rights recognized in the Act.,,,
However, it is difficult to determine, for example, if a state law
exempting five-family boarding houses is "substantially equivalent"
with Title VIII, which exempts only a four-family boarding house.
Congress apparently intended for the pre-emption provisions to be
read as liberally as possible, allowing state laws to prevail until
they proved inadequate to accomplish the stated purpose of the
Act.' It seems clear, however, that existing state laws should be
subject to federal pre-emption to the extent that they fail to provide
effective redress or administrative assistance to a person who would
have such opportunity under Title VIII. Some support for this view
is provided by section 815, which declares invalid any state law
which permits any discriminatory housing practice prohibited by
the federal statute. State legislation which does not prevent
discrimination by financial institutions, the real estate industry or
the individual homeowner should be particularly suspect, because it
is these institutions whose interests tend to support the status quo
and whose collective efforts dominate the housing market. The
federal courts and HUD should, therefore, be concerned not so
much with the available remedies and procedures under similar
state legislation as with the state law's effectiveness in securing
desired housing for persons to whom such housing would be
available under Title VIII.
The constitutionality of Title VIII will probably be affirmed as
soon as the question reaches the courts. In 1967 Attorney General
Clark proclaimed that he had "no doubt as to the constitutionality
of the [fair housing] bill."' 60 Congress based the constitutionality of
'm Id. § 3610(d). This provision has been interpreted by at least one district court as
limiting federal jurisdiction to those cases in which the plaintiff clearly has no available remedy
under state law. See Colon v. Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). See also 82 HARV. L. REV. 834, supra note 129, at 840-45.
' See. e.g.. 114 Co.,G. REC. S2456-57 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1968) (exchange between
Senators Dominick and Javits).
"1 1967 Hearings, supra note 3, at 7. Attorney General Clark argued that "Congress has
the constitutional authority and duty to remove whatever it reasonably considers to be a barrier
to equal protection of the law, even if the barrier is a product of individual action." Id. at 6.
See the brief prepared by the Justice Dept., id. at 8-14. This statement, of course, has not
gone unchallenged. "IThere is not the slightest shadow or constitutional justification for a
federal law simply prohibiting housing discrimination in general." Rice, supra note 44, at
165. The Senate found itself equally divided. "Under no theory of either the commerce
clause or the fourteenth amendment do I find constitutional authority to deprive any
individual of his basic, inherent right to hold, use and enjoy private property." 114 CONG.
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the fair housing bill on both the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment and the commerce clause."' The fourteenth
amendment clauses provide strong support to the assertion of
constitutionality and three Supreme Court decisions in 1966 and
one in 1968 lend themselves directly to these constitutional
considerations.
In Katzenbach v. Morgan" the Court was called upon to
determine the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965."1
Echoing its pronouncements in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 64
which had been decided earlier in the year, the Court affirmed its
position with respect to the criteria to be employed in weighing the
authority of Congress under the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments. Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, it said, gave
Congress broad powers whose reach was curtailed only by the
legitimacy of the legislation and by its appropriaieness to the
objects envisioned by the amendment.' The combined rationales of
the South Carolina and Morgan cases suggest that Congress may
use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibitions
of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, " and prohibition of
private discrimination in housing would appear to be a rational
approach to eliminating the ghetto. Moreover, it is arguable that
the disparity of access to and protection by local governmental
REc. S 1199 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1968) (statement of Senator Thurmond). On the other hand,
Senator Mondale believed he "could explore the constitutional issue at great length. but the
hearings to which I have referred amassed overwhelming and irrefutable authority
establishing without doubt the constitutionality of the amendment I have presented to the
Senate." 114 CoxG. REC. S986 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1968). See also Hearings on the Proposed
Civil Rights Act of 1967 Before the Subconin. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary. 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
"I' The fourteenth amendment and the commerce clause were the two constitutional
considerations most before Congress. See. e.g., 114 CONG. REc. S1453 (daily ed. Feb. 20,
1968); 1967 Hearings. supra note 3, at 7. Dean Pollack of the Yale Law School suggested
that the thirteenth amendment lent alternative support to the constitutionality of the then
pending bill. 1967 Hearings. supra, at 163.
384 U.S. 641 (1966).
t442 U.S.C. § 1973 (Supp. 1969).
1~I 383 U.S. 301 (1966). The argument posed in South Carolina was that in passing the
Voting Rights Act, Congress had exceeded its powers in trying to enforce the mandate of the
fifteenth amendment. The Court concluded that "Congress may use any rational means to
effectuate the constitutional prohibitions of racial discrimination in voting." Id. at 324.
1 384 U.S. at 650-51.
11 See. e.g., Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the.Promotion oJ Hunman
Rights, 80 HAV. L. REv. 91, 102, 107 (1966).
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exists even when the commercial effects upon which it is based are
minor or individually insignificant. 17 In addition, the fact that the
motive behind the fair housing legislation is less commercial than it
is moral does not preclude constitutional reliance on the commerce
clause.7 It appears, therefore, that the commerce clause provides
Congress with the power to enact the Federal Fair Housing Act.
Assuming it to be constitutional, an assessment of the eventual
impact of Title VIII upon segregated housing in America should be
made on the basis of what the Act was intended to achieve. It has
often been argued that racial prejudice is the sole cause of housing
discrimination and that such prejudice and its manifestations
cannot be eliminated by legislation. While all racial prejudice will
certainly not yield to the dictates of Congress, it appears that much
of the discrimination practiced in American housing is based on
factors other than racial prejudice.' The Fair Housing Act, by
acting upon and reducing economic motives and community
justifications for racial discrimination, may be expected to reduce
housing segregation. The fair housing law is not a panacea for the
nation's ills. On the contrary, the elimination of housing
discrimination is only one aspect of the assault upon the ghetto,
The inmediate eradication of the ghetto is not a goal of Title VIII.
Moreover, the Act should be successful in reducing the tension
surrounding housing discrimination. Following the enactment of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, which banned discrimination in public
accommodations, there was apparently a great deal of voluntary
compliance with the law.112 This was true even in those sections of
the country where pre-enactment opposition was the strongest.'
m
Perhaps the most dramatic change the Act will bring about is in
the housing industry. A major reason behind the industry's
I" Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300 (1964); Mabee v. White Plains Publishing
Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v.
Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942). See also Maryland v. Wirtz. 392 U.S. 183,
188-93 (1968).
' Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
Z', See notes 31, 34, 38, 39 and 41 supra and accompanying text.
311 See 1967 Hearings. supra note 3, at 26-27 (remarks of Att'y Gen. Clark). 47-48
(remarks of HUD Sec. Weaver).
' 
0 See. e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1965, at I, col. 2; 1967 Hearings. supra note 3. at 393
(George Meany).
"3 The Times article was based in part upon studies made in Monroe, La., Pine Bluff.
Ark., Rolling Fork, Miss., and Allendale, S.C. N.Y. Times, supra note 182.
Vol. 1969: 733)
DUKE LA W JOURNAL
discrimination is the fear of loss of business." Real estate agents
fear the loss of white customers if they serve non-white buyers, and
apartment owners and builders fear losing tenants and trade if they
admit non-white lessees. Title VIII has altered this competitive
situation so that all businessmen are operating under the same set
of rules, and there no longer is reason to fear loss of business since
the disenchanted customer will have no where else to go.
The effect upon individual homeowners should be equally
significant. Because a prime cause of private discrimination is
submission to community pressures,1 I Title VIII will now permit
the homeowner greater freedom in selecting buyers in that he now
can prove to his neighbors that he has no choice but to sell to
whomever wants to buy. Further impetus toward voluntary
compliance is provided by the fact that fair housing is now the law
of the land. It defines what is proper and improper conduct and
establishes a moral guideline by which the Congress believes the
Nation's populace should conduct itself. The importance of the Act
as a moral standard should not be minimized. Finally, the fact that
actual as well as punitive damages can be invoked for non-
compliance should provide some motivation toward adherence to
the terms of the statute.
HUD can fulfill a vital function under the Act's directive to the
Secretary to take immediate steps toward programs of education,'
for HUD may properly utilize its full resources to convince the
American people that the entrance of non-white persons into
previously all-white areas need not have a deleterious effect upon
property values. Comprehensive and objective proof of the de
minimis effect upon property values caused by Negro entrance into
communities should be made available to all real estate associations
and individual homeowners. 117
At the present time it appears very likely that HUD will be able
to provide only minimal assistance to complainants. One reason
that state equal employment commissions have been relatively
ineffective, according to some observers, is that they
characteristically remain physically removed and inaccessible to
I" See note 33 supra and accompanying text. See also letters written to Rep. Madden, 114
CONG. Rac. H2759 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1968).
, See notes 43-44 supra and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C.A. § 3609 (Supp. 1969).
See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
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potential complainantslu The obvious result is that many persons
who have valid claims fail to go to the trouble and expense of
utilizing the administrative machinery. In this context it is
interesting to note that the Congress, which passed the Fair
Housing Act amid much fanfare, quietly appropriated to HUD's
use less than one-fifth of the funds originally requested to provide
for the eight hundred and fifty field agents HUD desired to enforce
and oversee the Act.8 9 With only two million dollars granted out of an
original budget authorization of eleven million, Secretary Weaver
explained that "'[w]e simply cannot implement the fair housing law
without more personnel. . . .Without manpower, the fair housing
legislation is meaningless.' ' -0
If procedural and substantive difficulties do not vitiate Title
VIII, it may eventually provide an escape valve for Negro
frustration. Otherwise, it can at best serve only as a temporary
sedative. To at least a certain extent, however, exodus from the
ghetto is now a practical possibility.
I" Witherspoon. supra note 32, at 1191.
".'See 114 CoNa. Rt:c. S 11398 (daily ed. Sept. 25. 1968): H9844 (daily ed. Oct. II, 1968).
12124 CO\G. QTLY. ALMANAC 465 (1968).
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